This paper develops axioms and formal semantics for statements of the form \X is causally irrelevant to Y in context Z," which we interpret to mean \Changing X will not a ect Y if we hold Z constant." The axiomization of causal irrelevance is contrasted with the axiomization of informational irrelevance, as in \Learning X will not alter our belief in Y , once we know Z." Two versions of causal irrelevance are analyzed, probabilistic and deterministic. We show that, unless stability is assumed, the probabilistic de nition yields a very loose structure, that is governed by just two trivial axioms. Under the stability assumption, probabilistic causal irrelevance is isomorphic to path interception in cyclic graphs. Under the deterministic de nition, causal irrelevance complies with all of the axioms of path interception in cyclic graphs, with the exception of transitivity. We compare our formalism to that of Lewis, 1973] , and o er a graphical method of proving theorems about causal relevance.
Introduction
In Geiger et al., 1990 ], a set of axioms was developed for a class of relations called graphoids. These axioms characterize informational relevance 1 among observed events based on the semantics of conditional independence in probability calculus. This paper develops a parallel set of axioms for causal relevance, that is, the tendency of certain events to a ect the occurrence of other events in the physical world, independent of the observer-reasoner. Informational irrelevance is concerned with statements of the form \X is conditionally independent of Y given Z," which means that, given the value of Z, gaining information about X gives us no new information about Y . Causal irrelevance is concerned with statements of the form \X is causally irrelevant to Y given Z," which we take to mean \Changing X will not alter the value of Y , if Z is xed."
The notion of causal relevance has its roots in the philosophical works of Good, 1961] , Suppes, 1970] and Salmon, 1984] , who attempted to give probabilistic interpretations to cause e ect relationships, and recognized the need to distinguish causal from statistical relevance. Although these attempts have not produced an algorithmic de nition of causal relevance, they led to methods of testing the consistency of relevance statements against a given probability distribution and a given temporal ordering among the variables Cartwright, 1989 , Eells, 1991 , Pearl, 1996b . The current paper aims at axiomatizing relevance statements in themselves, with no reference to underlying probabilities or temporal orderings.
Axiomatic characterization of causal relevance may serve as a normative standard for theories of action as well as a guide for developing representation schemes (e.g., graphical models) for planning and decision-making applications. For example, instead of explicitly storing all possible e ects of an action, as in STRIPS Fikes and Nilsson, 1972] , such representation schemes should enable an agent to examine only direct e ects of actions, and infer which actions are relevant for a given goal, and which actions cease to be relevant once others are implemented.
An axiomization of causal relevance could also be useful to experimental researchers in domains where exact causal models do not exist. If we know, through experimentation, that some variables have no causal in uence on others in a system, we may wish to determine whether other variables will gain such in uence, perhaps under di erent experimental conditions, or may ask what additional experiments could provide such information. For example, suppose we nd that a rat's diet has no e ect on tumor growth while the amount of exercise is kept constant and, conversely, that exercise has no e ect on tumor growth while diet is kept constant. We would like to be able to infer that controlling only diet (while paying no attention to exercise) would still have no in uence on tumor growth. A more subtle inference problem is whether changing cage temperature could have an e ect on the rat's physical activity, having established that temperature has no e ect on activity when diet is kept constant and that temperature has no e ect on (the rat's choice of) diet when activity is kept constant.
We provide two formal de nitions of causal irrelevance, a probabilistic de nition and a deterministic de nition. The probabilistic de nition, which equates causal irrelevance with inability to change the probability of the e ect variable, has intuitive appeal but is inferentially very weak; it does not support a very expressive set of axioms unless further assumptions are made about the underlying causal theory. If we add the stability assumption (i.e., that no irrelevance can be destroyed by changing the nature of the individual processes in the system), then we obtain the same set of axioms for probabilistic causal irrelevance as the one governing path interception in directed graphs. The deterministic de nition, which equates causal irrelevance with inability to change the e ect variable (in any state of the world), allows for a richer set of axioms without making any assumptions about the causal theory. All of the path interception axioms for directed graphs, with the exception of transitivity, hold for deterministic causal irrelevance.
In Section 2, we de ne causal theories, a formal model for interpreting causal statements. In Section 3 we provide a de nition of probabilistic causal irrelevance, and determine which of the graphoid axioms hold under this de nition. Finally, in Section 4, we give a non-probabilistic de nition of causal irrelevance, and o er a graphical method of proving statements about causal irrelevance.
Causal Theories
A causal theory is a fully speci ed model of the causal relationships that govern a given domain, namely, a mathematical object that provides an interpretation (and computation) of every causal query about the domain. Following Pearl, 1995a] we will adopt here a de nition that generalizes most causal models used in engineering and economics.
De nition 1 (Causal Theory) A causal theory is a 4-tuple T =< V; U; P(u); ff i g > where (i) V = fX 1 ; : : :; X n g is a set of endogenous variables determined within the system, (ii) U = fU 1 ; : : :; U m g is a set of exogenous variables that represent disturbances, abnormalities, assumptions, or boundary conditions, (iii) P(u) is a distribution function over U 1 ; : : :; U m , and (iv) ff i g is a set of n deterministic, non-trivial functions, each of the form x i = f i (pa i ; u) i = 1; : : :; n
where pa i are the values of a set of variables PA i V n X i (connoting parents), called the direct causes of X i . We will assume that the set of equations in (iv) has a unique solution for X 1 ; : : :; X n , given any value of the disturbances U 1 ; : : :; U m . Thus we can consider each variable Y 2 V to be a function of the disturbances U in the causal theory T: Y = Y T (u). The uniqueness assumption is equivalent to the requirement that ff i g represent a deterministic physical system in equilibrium. Assuming that all relevant boundary conditions U were accounted for, such a system can only be in one state. Systems with feedback, however, can have several equilibrium states. For example, consider the equations x = y _ u and y = x _ u. The state U = 0 permits two possible solutions for X and Y | (X = 1; Y = 1) and (X = 0; Y = 0) | so such functions would be disallowed in a causal theory. Nonuniqueness, however indicates dependency on other factors, not modeled in U. Such factors often can be summarized by the notion of \previous state", and incorporated into our analysis as a third kind of variables supplementing V and U Galles, 1996a] . Drawing arrows between the variables PA i and X i de nes a directed graph G(T), which we call the causal graph of T. In general, G(T) can be cyclic. Figure 1 illustrates a simple yet typical causal graph. It describes the causal relationships among the season of the year (X 1 ), whether rain falls (X 2 ) during the season, whether the sprinkler is on (X 3 ) during the season, whether the pavement is wet (X 4 ), and whether the pavement is slippery (X 5 ). All variables in this gure are binary, taking a value of either \True" or \False," except the root variable X 1 which can take one of four values: \Spring," \Summer," \Fall," or \Winter." Here, the absence of a direct link between X 1 and X 5 , for example, captures our understanding that the in uence of seasonal variations on the slipperiness of the pavement is mediated by other conditions (e.g., the wetness of the pavement). The corresponding theory consists of ve functions, each representing an autonomous mechanism:
x 1 = U 1 x 2 = f 2 (X 1 ; U 2 ) x 3 = f 3 (X 1 ; U 3 ) x 4 = f 4 (X 3 ; X 2 ; U 4 ) x 5 = f 5 (X 4 ; U 5 )
The disturbances U 1 ; : : :; U 5 are not shown explicitly in Figure 1 , but are understood to govern the uncertainties associated with the causal relationships. A typical speci cation of the functions ff 1 ; : : :; f 5 g and the disturbance terms is given by the Boolean theory below: 
where x i stands for X i = true, and ab i and ab 0 i stand, respectively, for triggering and inhibiting abnormalities. For example, ab 4 stands for (unspeci ed) events that might cause the ground to get wet (x 4 ) when the sprinkler is o (:x 2 ) and it does not rain (:x 3 ), while :ab 0 4 stands for (unspeci ed) events that will keep the ground dry in spite of the rain, the sprinkler and ab 4 , say covering the ground with plastic sheet.
De nition 1 merely provides a description of the mathematical objects that enter into a causal theory. To meet our requirement that a causal theory be capable of computing answers for all causal queries, we need to supplement De nition 1 with an interpretation of the sentence \X = x causes Y = y." In ordinary discourse, such a sentence is normally interpreted to mean that we can bring about the condition Y = y by externally enforcing the condition X = x. Thus, De nition 1 needs to be supplemented with a formal interpretation of the notion \enforcing X = x" that is compatible with its usage in the language.
External intervention normally implies changing some mechanisms in the domain. In a logical circuit, for example, the act of enforcing the condition X i = 0 by connecting some intermediate variable X i to ground amounts to changing the mechanism that normally determines X i . If X i is the output of an OR gate, then after the intervention X i would no longer be determined by the OR gate but by a new mechanism (involving the ground) which clamps X i to 0 regardless of the input to the OR gate. In the equational representation, this amounts to replacing the equation X i = f i (pa i ; u) with a new equation, X i = 0, that represents the grounding of X i .
The replacement of just one equation, not several, re ects the principle of locality in the common understanding of imperative sentences such as: \Raise taxes" or \Make him laugh." When told to clean his face, a child does not ask for a razor, nor does he jump into the swimming pool. The proper interpretation of the modal sentence \do p" corresponds to a a minimal perturbation of the existing state of a airs, and this, in the context of De nition 1, corresponds to the replacement of a minimal set of equations necessary to make p compatible with U.
In general, we will consider concurrent action of the form do(X = x), where X involves several variables in V . 2 This leads to the following de nition:
De nition 2 (E ect of Actions) The e ect of the action do(X = x) on a causal theory T is given by a subtheory T x of T, where T x is obtained by deleting from T all equations corresponding to variables in X and substituting the equations X = x instead.
The syntactical transformation described in De nition 2 corresponds to replacing the old functional mechanisms x i = f i (PA i ; u) with new mechanisms X i = x i that represent the external forces that set the values x i for each X i 2 X. As before, we will assume each variable Y 2 V to be a unique function of the disturbances U in any theory T x : Y = Y Tx (u).
For brevity, the subscript T is often omitted, leaving Y x (u).
The assumption that there is a unique solution for X 1 ; : : : ; X n imposes some restrictions on the functions f i . However, the equations do not need to be recursive to ensure uniqueness. For example, the causal theory given by Figure 2 dictates unique values for X and Y for U 1 = 0 and U 1 = 1. The subtheories of T also dictate unique solutions; there is a unique value for Y (for both values of U 1 ) in T X=0 and T X=1 , and a unique value for X ( 2 The formalization of conditional actions of the form \do(X = x) if Z = z" is straightforward .
Returning to the example of Figure 1 , represent the action \turning the sprinkler ON," or do(X 3 = ON), we delete the equation X 3 = f 3 (X 1 ; U 3 ) from the theory of Eq. (2) and replace it with X 3 = ON. The resulting subtheory, T X 3 =ON , contains all the information needed for computing the e ect of the action on other variables. It is easy to see from this subtheory that the only variables a ected by the action are X 4 and X 5 , that is, the descendants of the manipulated variable X 3 . Note, however, that the operation do(X 3 = ON) stands in marked contrast to that of nding the sprinkler ON; the latter involves making the substitution without removing the equation for X 3 , and therefore may potentially in uence (the belief in) every variable in the network. This mirrors indeed the di erence between seeing and doing: after observing that the sprinkler is ON, we wish to infer that the season is dry, that it probably did not rain, and so on; no such inferences should be drawn in evaluating the e ects of the contemplated action \turning the sprinkler ON."
The notation Y x (u) is sometimes used in the statistical literature Rubin, 1974 ] to stand for the counterfactual sentence \The value that Y would take in person u, had X been x," where X stands for a type of treatment that a person can receive. There is a strong connection between the the sentence above and our interpretation of Y x (u) Pearl, 1995a] . De nition 2 interprets the abstract, counterfactual sentence above in terms of the processes responsible for Y taking on the value Y x (u) as X changes to x. It treats u not merely as an index of an individual but, rather, as the set of attributes u that characterize the individual, the experimental conditions under study, and so on. In Section 4, we will show that the process-based semantics given in De nition 2 will uncover new properties of Y x (u) that were not formalized in the statistical literature.
An explicit translation of intervention into \wiping out" equations from the causal model was rst proposed in Strotz and Wold, 1960] , and used in Fisher, 1970] and Sobel, 1990] . Graphical rami cations were explicated in Spirtes et al., 1993] and Pearl, 1993] . Interpretations of causal and counterfactual utterances in terms of Y x (u) are given in Pearl, 1996a] .Other formulations of causality, in terms of event trees are given in Robins, 1987] and Shafer, 1996] .
Note that Y x (u) is well de ned even when U = u and X = x are incompatible in T, thus allowing for actions to enforce propositions that are not realized under normal conditions. For example, if T describes a logic circuit we might wish to intervene and set some voltage X to x, even though the input dictates X 6 = x. It is for this reason that one must invoke some notion of mechanism breakdown or \surgery" in the de nition of interventions.
The unique feature of our formulation of actions, which sets it apart from the formulations in control theory or decision analysis Savage, 1954, Heckerman and Shachter, 1995] , is that an action is treated as a modality, namely, it is not given an explicit name but acquires the names of the propositions that it enforces as true. This enables the model to predict the e ect of a huge number of action combinations without the modeler having to attend to such combinations. Instead, the causal theory is constructed by specifying the characteristics of each individual mechanism under normal conditions, free of intervention. Likewise, the distribution P(u) need only characterize normal uctuations in boundary conditions, excluding abnormal eventualities such as interventions.
Probabilistic Causal Irrelevance
The fact that each endogenous variable is a function of U and that T speci es a probability distribution over U de nes a probability distribution over the endogenous variables. That is, for every set of variables Y V , we have
The probability induced by the action do(X = x) is de ned in the same manner, through the function Y x (u) induced by the subtheory T x . Usingx to abbreviate do(X = x), we obtain P(yjx) :
The existence of a probability distribution over all variables leads to a natural de nition of the probabilistic version of causal irrelevance.
De nition 3 (Probabilistic Causal Irrelevance) X is probabilistically causally irrelevant to Y , given Z, written CI P (X; Z; Y ), i 8x; x 0 ; y; z P(yjẑ;x) = P(yjẑ;x 0 ) (6) Read: Once we hold Z xed (at z), changing X will not a ect the probability of Y .
Comparison to Informational Relevance
If we remove the \hats" from De nition 3 above, we get the standard de nition of conditional independence in probability calculus, denoted I(X; Z; Y ), which is governed by the graphoid axioms Geiger et al., 1990] Intersection requires a strictly positive probability distribution. Figure 3 : The graphoid axioms.
These axioms, a special form of which was introduced in Dawid, 1979] and Spohn, 1980] , were rediscovered by Pearl and Paz, 1987] who conjectured them to be complete. The conjecture has been refuted by Studeny, 1990] , who also proved that conditional independence in probability theory has no nite axiomatization. Nevertheless, the graphoid axioms capture the most important features of informational relevance, \Learning irrelevant information should not alter the relevance status of other propositions in the system; what was relevant remains relevant, and what was irrelevant remains irrelevant. " Pearl, 1988] One of the most salient di erence between informational and causal relevance is the property of symmetry, axiom 1.1. Informational relevance is symmetric, stating that if X is relevant to Y , then Y is relevant to X as well. For example, learning whether the sprinkler is on provides information on whether the grass is wet and, vice versa, learning whether the grass is wet provides information on whether the sprinkler is on. This property is clearly violated in causal theories: turning a sprinkler on tends to make the grass wet, so turning on the sprinkler gives us information about the state of the grass. Conversely, wetting the grass has no physical e ect on the state of the sprinkler, and gives us no information about whether the sprinkler was on or o .
Another basic di erence between informational and causal relevance is that in the former the rule of hypothetical middle Pearl, 1988, p. 17] always holds: MIN x P(yjx) P(y) MAX x P(yjx) (7) In causal relevance, P(y) might greater than MAX x P(yjx), or less than MIN x P(yjx). In Figure 4 , there are two endogenous variables X and Y , as well as an exogenous variable U 1 . Without any intervention, X will always have the same value as U 1 , hence, Y will have the value 1. If X and U 1 have di erent values, then Y will have the value 0. If we intervene and set X to 1, then Y will have the value 1 when U 1 = 1, which has a probability 0.5, and Y will have the value 0 when U 1 = 0, which has a probability 0.5: P(Y = 0jset(X = 1)) = P(Y = 1jset(X = 1)) = 0:5. Similarly, we can see that P(Y = 0jset(X = 0)) = P(Y = 0jset(X = 1)) = 0:5. Thus, MAX x P(yjx) = 0:5, and P(Y = 1) = 1 > 0:5 = MAX x P(yjx).
Note that, in view of the violation of the rule of the hypothetical middle (Eq. (7)), De nition 3 is not equivalent to 8x; y; z P(yjẑ;x) = P(yjẑ) (8) Read: Once we hold Z xed (at z), controlling X will not a ect the probability of Y . In fact, De nition 3 is stronger than Eq. (8), since statement 2.5.2 (left-intersection of Theorem 1 below) follows from the former and not from the latter.
The notion of probabilistic causal irrelevance may bring to mind a related concept of ignorability Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 ] which is extremely important in analyzing the e ectiveness of treatments (e.g., drugs, diet, educational programs) from uncontrolled studies. The two concepts are however di erent. Ignorability allows us to ignore HOW X obtained its value x, while irrelevance allows us to ignore which value X actually obtained. Ignorability is de ned as the condition P(Y x = yjz) = P(Y = yjz; x) (9) which in our notation reads: P(yjz;x) = P(yjz; x) (10) It allows an investigator to relate the response Y x to observable conditional probabilities. A central question in experimental design is to select a set of observables Z that would make Eq. 9 true, given causal knowledge of the domain. Ignorability in itself does not provide such a criterion; though it states the problem in formal counterfactual language: \Z can be selected if, for every x, the value that Y would obtain had X been x is conditionally independent of X, given Z." A criterion for selecting Z can be obtained from the graph G(T) underlying a causal theory, as given by the \back-door criterion" in Pearl, 1995a] .
The question we attempt to answer in this section is whether the relation of causal irrelevance, CI P ( ), is governed by a set of axioms similar to those governing informational irrelevance I( ). An extreme way of motivating this question would be to ask whether there are any constraints that prohibit the assignment of arbitrary functions P(yjx) to any pair (X; Y ) of variable sets in V , in total disregard of the fact that P(yjx) represents the probability of (Y = y) induced by physically setting X to x in some causal theory T. Our nding indicate that, although the assignment P(yjx) is not totally arbitrary, it is only weakly constrained by axioms of causal irrelevance.
Axioms of Probabilistic Causal Irrelevance
We have found only two axioms that constrain causal irrelevance.
Theorem 1 For any causal theory, the following two properties must hold : 2.2.1 (Right-Decomposition) CI P (X; Z; Y W) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ) & CI P (X; Z; W) 2.5.2 (Left-Intersection) CI P (X; ZW; Y ) & CI P (W; ZX; Y ) =) CI P (XW; Z; Y ) Property 2.2.1 reads: If changing X has no e ect on Y and W considered jointly, then it has no e ect on either Y or W considered separately. This follows trivially from the fact that P( ) is a probability function, but it does not re ect any quality of causation.
Property 2.5.2 reads: If changing X cannot a ect P(y) when W is xed, and changing W cannot a ect P(y) when X is xed, then changing X and W together cannot a ect P(y).
Many seemingly intuitive properties, however, do not hold. For instance, none of the following sentences hold for all causal theories. 2.2.2 (Left-Decomposition-1) CI P (XW; Z; Y ) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ) _ CI P (W; Z; Y ) 2.2.3 (Left-Decomposition-2) CI P (XW; Z; Y ) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ) _ CI P (X; Z; W) 2.2.4 (Left-Decomposition-3) CI P (XW; Z; Y ) & CI P (XY; Z; W) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ) _ CI P (X; Z; W) 2.3 (Weak Union) CI P (X; Z; WY ) =) CI P (X; ZW; Y ) 2.4 (Contraction) CI P (X; Z; Y ) & CI P (X; ZY; W) =) CI P (X; Z; WY ) 2.5.1 (Right-Intersection) CI P (X; ZW; Y ) & CI P (X; ZY; W) =) CI P (X; Z; WY ) 2.6 (Transitivity) CI P (X; Z; Y ) =) CI P (a; Z; Y ) _ CI P (X; Z; a) 8a 6 2 X Z Y The sentences above were tailored after the graphoid axioms (Figure 3 ) with the provision that symmetry does not hold, thus requiring left and right versions. Many of these sentences have intuitive appeal and yet are not sound relative to the semantics of P(yjx). For example; property 2.2.2 states that if changing X has an e ect on Y , and changing W has an e ect on Y , then changing X and W simultaneously should also a ect Y . It is hard to come up with a simple real-life example that refutes this assertion. Still, as will be shown in the Section 3.4 and in Appendix A, each of these sentences is refuted by some speci c causal theory.
Proofs of Axioms of Probabilistic Causal Irrelevance
We now prove the two sentences of Theorem 1.
2.2.1 CI P (X; Z; Y W)=)CI P (X; Z; Y )&CI P (X; Z; W) holds trivially. CI P (X; Z; Y W)=) P(ywjẑ;x) = P(ywjẑ;x 0 ). We can sum over W to get P(yjẑ;x) = P(yjẑ;x 0 ), which implies CI P (X; Z; Y ). 
Counterexample to Property 2.2.2
We now disprove property 2.2.2 by counterexample. This counterexample is not necessarily meant to model a common, real-life situation. Rather, it disproves the claim that all possible causal theories must conform to the property. This counterexamples is more clear when we consider the contrapositive form of the claim. In this example, changing W can a ect the probability of Y , and changing X can a ect the probability of Y , but changing W and X simultaneously has no e ect on the probability of Y . This is extremely counterintuitive, if tweaking X has an e ect on Y , and tweaking W has an e ect on Y , we would expect the more exible option of changing X and W simultaneously to also a ect Y . The key to this counterexample is the fact that setting W removes the connection between W and U 1 . When we intervene on only X, W takes on the same value as U 1 , and Y will always have the value of X. When we intervene on both X and W, there is no longer any connection between U 1 and W. Thus, the probability that W and U 1 will have the same value is 0.5, and P(y) = 0:5 Counterexamples to the other properties (2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5.1, 2.6) are in Appendix A.
Numeric Constraints
Although De nition 3 imposes only weak constraints (axiom 2.2.1 and 2.5.2) on the structure of probabilistic causal irrelevance, the probability assignments P(yjx), which describe the e ects of actions in the domain, are constrained nevertheless by non-trivial numerical bounds. For instance, the inequality (yjx;ẑ) P(y; zjx) (11) must hold in any causal theory. This can easily be shown by the de nition of P(y; zjx) and P(yjx;ẑ). Recall from Eq. (5) to have the value z, xing Z at z will not a ect the value of Y . Thus, for all values u of U yz , Y xz (u) = y. Hence, U y z U yz and P(yjx;ẑ) P(yzjx). This can be shown more formally using Theorem 6, which is proven below, in Section 4.2. Additional constraints are explored in Pearl, 1995b ].
Axioms of Causal Irrelevance for Stable Theories
The set of axioms we obtained for causal irrelevance was much smaller than we would expect from our intuition of causal e ect relations. We have two explanations for this discrepancy. One possibility is that probabilistic causal irrelevance does not capture our intuition of causal mechanisms. This possibility will be explored in Section 4, which gives a deterministic de nition of causal irrelevance and yields a more complete set of axioms. The other possibility is that the type of examples exploited in Section 3.4 and Appendix A are not commonly observed in everyday life. This section explores what assumptions need to be made for probabilistic causal irrelevance to have a more expressive set of axioms.
A more expressive set of causal irrelevance axioms is obtained if we con ne the analysis to stable causal theories, that is, causal theories whose irrelevances are implied by the structure of the causal theory, and, hence, remain invariant to changes in the forms of each individual functions f i . We will de ne stability through the concept of a replacement class. A replacement class is a set of all theories that have the same variables V and U, and the same functional arguments. In other words, the functions are allowed to change between members of , but the arguments of these functions are not allowed to vary. We now de ne stability using replacement classes, similar to Pearl and Verma, 1991a] 3 .
De nition 4 (Stability) Let T be a causal theory. An irrelevance CI P (X; Z; Y ) in T is stable if it is shared by all theories in (T). The theory T is stable if all of the irrelevances in T are stable. Stability requires irrelevance to be determined by the structure of the equations, not merely by the parameters of the functions. Thus, a causal theory is not stable if we can remove an irrelevance relationship by replacing an equation or set of equations to obtain a new theory with fewer irrelevance statements. In each of the examples in Section 3.4 and Appendix A, for instance, a minor change in the form of one of the equations would destroy an irrelevance. Note that none of the theories presented in Figure 5 or the appendix is stable.
There are, however, many stable causal theories. All monotonic linear systems, for example, are stable. One might think that any causal theory that contained only additive, monotonic functions f i would be stable. The causal theory of Figure 16 , however, refutes that conjecture. . We can do this by changing all of the functions that lie on the path from X to Y to disjunctions and then modifying the other functions to ensure that P(yjẑ) < 1. Thus, if we force X to have the value 1, Y will also have the value 1, and P(yjẑ;x) 6 = P(yjẑ). By assumption, CI P (X; Z; Y ), so CI(T) 6 CT(T 0 ). Thus, T is not a stable causal theory, a contradiction. 
(T).
We can now prove the implication int(X; Z; Y ) G(T) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ). We will consider f Y , the functional equation for Y in T z . After we do a functional substitution for all variables in f Y except for X and Z, we are left with a new function g Y . By Lemma 1, since there is no directed path from X to Y in G(T z ), X is not an argument of g Y , so g Y is a function of only Z and U. Since g Y is a function of only Z and U, and not of X, Y xz (u) = Y z (u), so P(yjx;ẑ) = P(yjẑ), and CI P (X; Z; Y ). 2
Since CI P (X; Y; Z) () int(X; Y; Z) G(T) in stable causal theories, probabilistic causal irrelevance is completely characterized by the axioms of path interception in directed graphs. A complete set of such axioms was developed in Paz and Pearl, 1994, Paz et al., 1996] and is given in Figure 6 . 
Causal Irrelevance
The notion of causal irrelevance obtains a deterministic de nition when we consider the e ects of an action conditioned on a speci c state of the world u.
De nition 6 (Causal Irrelevance) X is causally irrelevant to Y , given Z, in a causal theory This de nition of irrelevance bears some similarity to the idea of limited unresponsiveness presented in Heckerman and Shachter, 1995] . However, whereas Heckerman and Shacter de ne causality in terms of limited unresponsiveness to a speci c set of actions, we view irrelevance as a property of a causal theory. In fact, a version of their de nition of causality, translated into our language, will be shown to be a theorem of causal irrelevance in Section 4.6.2 (see Eq. (18)).
To see why we require the equality Y xz (u) = Y x 0 z (u) to hold in every subtheory of T z , consider the causal theory of Figure 7 . In this example, Z follows X and, hence, Y follows X, that is, Y X=0 (u) = Y X=1 (u) = u 2 . However, since f y is a nontrivial function of X, X is perceived to be causally relevant to Y . Only holding Z constant would reveal the causal in uence of X on Y . To capture this intuition, we must therefore consider all subtheories in De nition 6. V = fX; Z; Y g binary U = fU 1 ; U 2 g binary x = u 1 y = u 2 if x = z x otherwise z = x P(u 1 ) = P(u 2 ) = 0:5 
Theorems of Causal Statements
To prove the causal irrelevance axioms, we will use some of the following theorems and de nitions.
De nition 7 (Null Action) For any variable X, X ; (u) = X(u).
De nition 7 provides an interpretation for a null subscript, which will be needed in the proofs below. 
Proof: Corollary 15 follows directly from Composition. Substituting X for W and ; for X in Eq. (14), we obtain X ; (u) = x =) Y ; (u) = Y x (u). Null Action allows us to drop the ;, leaving
The implication in Eq. (15) was called Consistency by Robins, 1987] . 4 Theorem 7 (Reversibility) For any variables X and W, and set of variables X,
Proof:
Reversibility follows from the assumption that the solution for V in every subtheory is unique. Since Y x (u) has a unique solution, forming T x and substituting out all other variables would yield a unique solution for Y , regardless of the order of substitution. So, we will form T x and examine the structural equation for Y in T x , which might in general be a function of , we will get the same result as before, namely, Y xw = f(x; w; u). In the same way, we can show that W x = g(x; y; u) and W xy = g(x; y; u). So, solving for y = Y x (u), w = W x (u) is the same as solving for y = f(x; w; u) and w = g(x; y; u), which is the same as solving for y = Y xw (u), w = W xy (u). Thus, any solution y to y = Y xw (u); w = W xy (u) would also be a solution to y = Y x (u). 2 Reversibility re ects memoryless behavior { the state of the system, V , tracks the state of U, regardless of its history. A typical example of irreversibility is a system of two agents (as in the prisoners' dilemma) who adhere to a \tit-for-tat" strategy. Such a system has two stable solutions, cooperation and defection, under the same external conditions U and, therefore, does not satisfy the Reversibility condition; forcing either one of the agents to cooperate results in the other agent's cooperation (Y w (u) = y; W y (u) = w), yet this does not guarantee cooperation from the start (Y (u) = y; W(u) = w). Irreversibility, in such examples, is a product of using too coarse a state description, where not all of the factors which determine the ultimate state of the system are included in U. In the tit-for-tat example, such factors should include the previous actions of the players. Reversibility is restored once these factors are included.
The properties of Null Action, Degeneracy and Composition are complete for recursive systems. In non-recursive systems, Null Action, Degeneracy, Composition, and Reversibility are not complete. If, however, we replace Reversibility with a slightly stronger property, we obtain a complete (but not sound) set of properties Galles, 1996b] .
Proofs of Causal Irrelevance Axioms
Using the theorems from the previous section, we can prove the axioms of causal irrelevance. 
Causal Relevance and Lewis's Counterfactuals
It is instructive to compare our framework to that of Lewis, 1973] . We give here a version of Lewis's logic for counterfactual sentences (from Lewis, 1981] ). Rules (1) If A and A =) B are theorems, so is B. true for causal theories, and follow from Degeneracy, Composition, and Reversibility. 5 In order to relate Lewis's axioms to our own, we need a translation from his syntax to ours:
where Y B is a variable with values fB; Bg. We can now examine each of Lewis's axioms in turn.
(1) Trivially True.
(2) This axiom is the same as Degeneracy, and it is stated in our formalism as X x (u) = x. We see that Lewis's axioms are more general, hence less powerful. Composition is a consequence of Lewis's axiom (5) and rule (1). Reversibility, however, is not enforced by the Lewis framework. Lewis's axiom (3), while similar, is not as strong as Reversibility. Y = y may hold in all closest w-worlds, W = w may hold in all closest y-worlds and, still, Y = y may not hold in our world.
Why Transitivity Fails in Causal Relevance
Causal transitivity is a property that makes intuitive sense, which we would like to explain with an axiomatic de nition. If a variable A has a causal in uence on B, and B has a causal in uence on C, one would think that A would have causal in uence on C. However, this is not always the case, even in deterministic causality. Consider the causal theory described in Figure 16 of Appendix A, reprinted here as Figure 8 .
In this example, X is not causally irrelevant to W, and W is not causally irrelevant to Y , but X is causally irrelevant to Y . The intuition behind this example is that changing X can only cause a minor change in W, while Y only responds to large changes in W. However, the failure of transitivity is deeper then that. Even when X has more complete control over the intermediate variable W, we may still not be able to achieve transitivity. Consider the causal theory of Figure 9 .
This theory is the same as the theory of Figure 8 , except that W has now been split into W 1 : : : W 4 , corresponding to W's four possible values. That is, W 1 is true if x + u 2 = 0, W 2 V = fX; W; Y g, x; y 2 f0; 1g, w 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g U = fU 1 ; U 2 g u 1 ; u 2 2 f0; 1g w = x + 2 u 2 x = u 1 y = (w > 1) P(u 1 ) = P(u 2 ) = 0:5 
Graphs as Theorem Provers
Consider an oracle that takes in statements about path interception and returns YES if the statement holds in all directed graphs and NO otherwise. We will show that such an oracle can be used to validate or refute sentences about causal irrelevance.
First, let the canonical form for sentences in the language of causal irrelevance be an implication, whose antecedent consists of a conjunction of non-negated literals, and consequent consists of non-negated literals. 
Looking at each of the corresponding path interception sentences in turn, we nd that H 1 g : int(X; Z; Y ) G =)int(a; Z; Y ) G is not true for all directed graphs, and H 2 g : int(X; Z; Y ) G =) int(X; Z; a) G is also not true for all directed graphs, that is, if Z intercepts all paths from X to Y , it is not the case that either Z intercepts all paths from any other variable to Y or Z intercepts all paths from X to any other variable. Thus, transitivity is not a theorem in all causal theories.
Proof (of Theorem 8)
First, we prove that if there are no disjunctions in the consequent of a canonical form sentence, then the sentence is true if and only if the corresponding sentence is true for path interception in directed graphs.
We will prove this by contradiction. Assume that there exists some theorem A =) B, where A and B are conjunctions of literals such that : A =) B is not a theorem in causal irrelevance A g =) B g is a theorem in path interception in directed graphs Since A g =) B g is a theorem in path interception, then we must be able to generate B g from A g using the axioms of path interception in directed graphs.
Also, since A =) B is not a theorem in causal irrelevance, every such generation of B g from A g must include the application of the axiom of transitivity. When the axiom of transitivity is used, a disjunction is created. This disjunction must be used in the generation of B g . By assumption, B g does not contain a disjunction. Also, none of the antecedents of any of the axioms of path interception contain disjunctions. Thus the only way to use this disjunction in the generation of B g is to to resolve the disjunction with a negated clause. Since A g started with no negated statements, and none of the axioms of path interception can be used to create negated statements, we cannot resolve the disjunction with anything. Thus the generation of B g from A g did not require an application of transitivity, a contradiction.
Next, we prove that if a theorem A =) B _ C is a theorem in causal irrelevance, then either A=)B is a theorem in causal irrelevance or A=)C is a theorem in causal irrelevance.
If A=)B _C is a theory in causal irrelevance, then we must be able to generate B _C from A using the axioms of causal irrelevance. Since no axiom creates a disjunction, the only way to generate B _ C from A is to either generate B from A and add C, or generate C from A and add B.
Thus, a causal irrelevance sentence is a theorem if and only if there is a path interception theorem that corresponds to one of the Horn components of the original sentence.
5 Conclusions
How do scientists predict the outcome of one experiment from the results of other experiments run under totally di erent conditions? Such transfer of experimental knowledge, though it is essential to scienti c progress, involves inferences that cannot easily be formalized in the standard languages of logic, physics, or probability.
The formalization of such inferences requires a language within which the experimental conditions prevailing in one experiment can be represented, and the outcome of that experiment can be posed as constraint in the design and analysis of the next experiment. The description of experimental conditions, in turn, involves both observational and manipulative sentences, and requires that manipulative phrases (e.g., \having no e ect on," \holding Z xed"), as distinct from observational phrases (e.g., \being independent of," \conditioning on Z"), 7 be given formal notation, semantical interpretation, and axiomatic characterization. It turns out that standard algebras, including the algebra of equations, Boolean algebra, and probability calculus, are all geared to serve observational sentences, but not manipulative sentences.
This paper bases the semantics of manipulative sentences on a set of structural equations that we call a causal theory. Unlike ordinary algebraic equations, a causal theory treats every equation as an independent mathematical object attached to one and only one variable. Actions are treated as modalities and are interpreted as the nonalgebraic operator of replacing equations.
This semantics permits us to develop an axiomatic characterization of manipulative statements of the form \Changing X will not a ect Y if we hold Z constant," that we propose as the meaning of causal irrelevance: \X is causally irrelevant to Y in context Z." This axiomatization highlights the di erences between causal and informational irrelevance, as in \Finding X will not a ect our belief in Y, once we know Z." The former shows a closer a nity to graphical representation than the latter. Under the deterministic de nition, causal irrelevance complies with all of the axioms of path interception in cyclic graphs, with the exception of transitivity. This a nity leads to graphical methods of proving theorems about causal relevance and explains, in part, why graphs are so prevalent in causal talk and causal modeling.
7 Philosophers, statisticians, and economists have been notoriously sloppy about confusing \holding Z constant" with \conditioning on a given Z" Pearl, 1995a] .
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This research was partially supported by Air Force grant #AFOSR/F496209410173, NSF grant #IRI-9420306, and Rockwell/Northrop Micro grant #94-100. We thank Joe Halpern for commenting on the rst draft of this paper and for noting that property 4.5.1 does not hold in Lewis' closest-world In this example, changing X can a ect the probability of Y , and changing X can a ect the probability of W, but changing X and W together cannot a ect the probability of Y . Since changing X a ects the value of W, it makes sense to think that intervening on W while intervening on X would not interfere with the e ect that X has on Y . However, X does not completely control W. That is, when we only intervene on X, U 1 still has some e ect on W. Controlling both X and Y removes the in uence of U 1 on W. As in the property 2.2.2, removing the connection between U 1 and W prevents X from having an e ect on Y .
2.2.4 CI P (XW; Z; Y ) & CI P (XY; Z; W) =) CI P (X; Z; Y ) _ CI P (X; Z; W).
In Figure 11 , we can see that P(w) = P(y) = 0:5; P(wjset(X = 1)) = P(yjset(X = 1)) = 0:75; P(wjx;ŷ) = 0:5 for all values ofx;ŷ; and P(yjx;ŵ) = 0:5 for all values ofx;ŵ e ect on P(w) when Y is held constant. In the other, W is a function of U 1 , and Y is a function of X; W, and U 1 . Also as in 2.2.2, X can a ect Y when W has the same value as U 1 , but it has no e ect on P(w) when W is xed. U 2 determines which model is in e ect at any given time. While intervening on only X can a ect P(w) and P(y), simultaneously changing X and Y together have no e ect on P(w), and simultaneously changing X and W together have no e ect on P(y). In this example, X does not have any e ect on Y since P(y) = 0, and X can only act as an inhibitor if Y . When we intervene on W, then it is possible for Y to have the value 1, and X can a ect the probability of Y . Thus, X can only a ect Y when we intervene on W, and X has no e ect on W. 2.4 CI P (X; Z; Y ) & CI P (X; ZY; W) =) CI P (X; Z; WY ).
In the causal theory in Figure 13 , CI P (X; ;; Y ) & CI P (X; Y; W) & :CI P (X; ;; WY ).
While changing X can a ect P(w) (and hence P(y; w)) when Y is not held xed, and changing X has no e ect on P(y), xing Y blocks the e ect that X has on W. Fixing W prevents X from altering the probability of Y , and xing Y prevents X from altering the probability of W, but X can change the probability of W (and hence the probability of W & Y ) if there is no intervention on Y .
Up to this point, all of the counterexamples have relied on some exogenous variable from U having two di erent children in V . Obviously, this is not essential, since we could always create similar examples in which each exogenous variable has exactly one child. For example, in the theory of Figure 14 , we could replace U 2 with Z to get the theory of Figure 15 .
In this theory, all of the exogenous variables U have exactly one child, yet property 2.5.1 still does not hold. There is still an undirected cycle in the underlying causal graph, which is required for property 2.5.1 to be false. Properties 2.2.1 { 2.6 are all true for all causal theories whose causal graphs are trees. In addition, properties 2.2.1{2.5.2 are true for all causal theories whose causal graphs are polytrees. Property 2.6, as we will see now, is not always true, even when we restrict its causal graph to be a polytree.
2.6 CI P (X; Z; Y ) =) CI P (a; Z; Y ) _ CI P (X; Z; a) 8a 6 2 X Z Y .
In the causal theory of Figure 16 
